Abstract What modern game theorists describe as "fictitious play" is not the learning process George W. Brown defined in his 1951 paper. His original version differs in a subtle detail, namely the order of belief updating. In this note we revive Brown's original fictitious play process and demonstrate that this seemingly innocent detail allows for an extremely simple and intuitive proof of convergence in an interesting and large class of games: nondegenerate ordinal potential games.
Introduction
Almost every modern textbook on game theory at least mentions the classical learning process known as fictitious play or as the Brown-Robinson learning process, introduced by Brown (1951) as an algorithm for finding the value of a zero-sum game, and first studied by Robinson (1951) . Informal descriptions usually depict two players playing a finite game repeatedly. After arbitrary initial moves in the first round, in every round each player plays a myopic pure best response against the empirical strategy distribution of his opponent. It was once hoped that the players' beliefs, i.e. their empirical strategy distributions, always converge to the set of Nash equilibria in such a process.
While Robinson (1951) showed this to hold for zero-sum games, and Miyazawa (1961) extended it to 2×2 games, Shapley (1964) gave an example of a 3×3 game where the beliefs do not converge. Since then a bulk of literature has tried to identify classes of games where global convergence holds, including Milgrom and Roberts (1991) , Krishna (1992) , Hofbauer (1995) , Shapley (1996a, 1996b) Indeed, fictitious play was "invented" two years earlier by Brown (1949) in an unpublished RAND report. In this report, he also defines his algorithm with players updating their beliefs alternatingly, mentioning only briefly that a minor variant (p. 
Definitions
We start with the notation and some definitions:
Let (A, B) be an n×m bimatrix game, i.e. a finite two-player game, where player 1, the row player, has pure strategies i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and player 2, the column player, has pure strategies j ∈ M = {1, 2, . . . , m}. A and B are the n×m payoff matrices for players 1 and 2. If player 1 chooses i and player 2 chooses j, the payoffs to players 1 and 2 are a ij and b ij , respectively. The sets of mixed strategies of player 1 and 2 are the probability simplices S n and S m , respectively, and mixed strategies are written as column vectors. With a little abuse of notation we will not distinguish between a pure strategy and the corresponding mixed strategy representation as a unit vector. 
Nondegenerate Games
It has been shown by Monderer and Sela (1996) 
and 
Clearly, a weighted potential game has an ordinal potential. Note that the former imposes a cardinal condition on the payoffs, while the latter requires only an ordinal condition. Hence the class of ordinal potential games is a "large" class from a measure theoretic viewpoint, while the class of weighted potential games is negligible. 3 For weighted potential games Monderer and Shapley (1996b) proved global convergence of SFP to the equilibrium set. However, for ordinal potential games no such result is known.
Monderer and Shapley (1996b) also define improvement paths and games with the finite improvement property. We extend this definition by introducing improvement steps.
Definition 4 For a bimatrix game (A, B), define the following binary relation on N ×M :
(i, j) → (i , j ) ⇔ (i = i and b ij > b ij ) or (j = j and a i j > a ij ).
If (i, j) → (i , j ), we say that this is an improvement step. An improvement path is a (finite or infinite) sequence of improvement steps
(i 1 , j 1 ) → (i 2 , j 2 ) → (i 3 , j 3 ) → · · · in N ×M . An improvement path (i 1 , j 1 ) → · · · → (i k , j k ) is called an improvement cycle, if (i k , j k ) = (i 1 ,
j 1 ). A bimatrix game is said to have the finite improvement property (FIP), if every improvement path is finite, i.e., if there are no improvement cycles.
3 The set of n×m bimatrix games can be identified with the Euclidean space R 2nm . It can be shown that within this space, the set of ordinal potential games contains an open set, while the set of weighted potential games is a null set (has Lebesgue-measure zero), if n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 3.
It is clear that every nondegenerate game with an ordinal potential has the FIP. Monderer and Shapley (1996b) show that also the opposite direction holds:
Lemma 1 A nondegenerate bimatrix game has the FIP if and only if it is
an ordinal potential game.
Fictitious Play
The following definition corresponds to Brown's original version of fictitious play, where players update alternatingly:
Definition 5 For the n×m bimatrix game (A, B), the sequence (i t , j t ) t∈N
is an alternating fictitious play process (AFP process), if i 1 ∈ N and for all t ∈ N,
where the beliefs x(t) and y(t) are given by
The definition of SFP differs from that of AFP only in the order of updating:
Definition 6 For the n×m bimatrix game (A, B) , the sequence (i t , j t ) t∈N is a simultaneous fictitious play process (SFP process),
and for all t ∈ N,
where x(t) and y(t) are defined as above.
If a fictitious play process (AFP or SFP) converges, it must be constant from some stage on, implying that the limit is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Even if the process does not converge, it is easily established that if the beliefs converge, then the limit must be a Nash equilibrium (which need not be pure, however).
Note that the beliefs can be updated recursively. The belief of a player in round t + 1 is a convex combination of his belief in round t and his opponent's move in round t + 1:
When a player plays some pure strategy at time t and some different pure strategy at time t + 1, we say that he switches at time t.
. We say that player 1 switches from i to k at time t, if i = k. Analogously, player 2 switches from j to l at time t, if j = l.
The Result
Assume there is a switch from (i, j) to (k, l) at time t > 1, i.e. i = k or j = l. Then i is a best response to y(t − 1) and k is a best response to y(t), implying i·Ay(t − 1) − k ·Ay(t − 1) ≥ 0 and i·Ay(t) − k ·Ay(t) ≤ 0.
with equation (2) Intuitively, in an AFP process in a nondegenerate game a switch from one pure-strategy pair to another pure-strategy pair implies that there is an improvement path from the former to the latter. This improvement path consists of one or two improvement steps, depending on whether only one player switches, or both. Hence AFP processes essentially follow improvement paths in nondegenerate games. If a game has the FIP, as nondegenerate ordinal potential games do, then the process cannot involve cycles, and must terminate in a pure Nash equilibrium.
Discussion
In nondegenerate ordinal potential games, AFP processes cannot cycle, because there are no improvement cycles. Why has this simple fact remained unnoticed in all the studies of fictitious play? The obvious reason seems to be that these studies work with SFP, and things are more difficult when players update simultaneously. Indeed, if both players switch at the same time in an SFP process, there need not be an improvement path from the old to the new pure-strategy profile. To see this, imagine a 2×2 coordination game and two SFP players starting from a pure-strategy profile where they miscoordinate. In the second round they will again miscoordinate, since both switch to their other strategy. Clearly, however, there is no improvement path connecting one miscoordination profile to the other.
It is easy to extend our theorem to SFP processes where from some time on the players never switch simultaneously. 4 The problem is to rule out processes where players continue to do this infinitely often. An example of such a nonconvergent SFP process was constructed by Foster and Young (1998) . This is not a counterexample, however, since their game does not have an ordinal potential. While I conjecture our theorem to hold for SFP generically, this question remains open.
